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States of “State Buddhism”:
History, Religion, and Politics in Late Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Scholarship

The most commonly employed framework for assessing the religion of the Nara period (710-784) remains the state Buddhism model (kokka Bukkyō ron 国家仏教論) advanced by Inoue Mitsusada 井上光貞 (1917-1983). While Inoue provided the most systematic and influential version of this thesis, this article traces its origins at least as far back as the Meiji period (1868-1912). It argues that there has been not one state Buddhism model but several. Different versions emerged at particular historical moments in specific institutional settings in response to contemporary challenges. This article does not assess these frameworks in terms of their historical accuracy, but instead treats scholarship on Nara Buddhism as a lens that magnifies problems facing diverse modern actors ranging from Buddhist reformers to National Historians. In revealing the historical conditions that gave birth to the state Buddhism model, I hope to encourage twenty-first-century scholars to reflect on some of the assumptions behind narratives frequently employed for understanding premodern Japanese religions, as well as better understand the connection between politics and scholarship in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Japan.

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1. Tamura 1982: 208. I would like to thank James Dobbins, Hayashi Makoto, Orion Klautau, Satō Fumiko, Jacqueline Stone, and Jolyon Thomas for conversations and comments on this project and earlier drafts.

Japanese Religions, Vol. 39 (1 & 2): 71-93
Prior to the publication of revisionist works in the last two decades, Tamura Enchō’s assessment rang true: very few scholars writing in the last century and a half objected to models equating the Buddhism of the Nara period (710-784) with state Buddhism (kokka Bukkyō 国家仏教). Historical narratives that interpret Nara Buddhism relative to the state go back at least as far as the late nineteenth century. These frameworks continue to be employed in textbooks, scholarly articles, and monographs on Japanese Buddhism written in recent years. The model is, in many ways, a natural one – the eighth century witnessed the promulgation of legal codes regulating the activities of monks and nuns alongside large-scale imperial projects to construct temples, copy sutras, and commission statues.

But the purpose of this essay is not to debate whether or not the state Buddhism model accurately captures the nuances of the period, a topic I have explore at length elsewhere. Instead, I will demonstrate the contingent and multivalent nature of the category “state Buddhism,” treating it as a concept that speaks more to modern concerns than to the historical realities of ancient Japan. The state Buddhism model does not refer to a single theory, but rather to a variety of approaches that share a belief in the centrality of the state for understanding Nara-period Buddhism. Treatments of state Buddhism, ranging from nostalgic and sympathetic to suspicious and critical, competed with one another and emerged side by side, oscillating in influence throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The fragmented nature of the narrative highlights the diverse ways individuals ranging from Buddhist reformers to national historians used historical narrative as a means to navigate the ambiguous and ever-changing relationship between religion and state in the modern period.

Versions of the state Buddhism model emerged at particular historical moments in specific institutional settings in response to contemporary debates and challenges. Each incarnation addressed burning issues in academic and religious circles. These included the constitutional separation of church and state, the adoption of an officially recognized religion, Japanese imperialism and national identity, and the modernization and reformation of Buddhism. As James Ketelaar, Orion Klautau and others have shown, the emergence of modern historical studies in the late nineteenth century served as a tool that Buddhists could use to reconstruct the tradition to meet the demands of the modern age.

Different groups learned different lessons from the past. For Buddhist reformers in the 1890s, history offered guidance – both in its successes and failures – useful toward solidifying their religion’s position in Japanese society after a period of aggressive persecution known as the haibutsu kishaku 廻仏毀釈 movement. During

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2. For a sustained analysis of this question, see Lowe 2012.
the era of empire building in the first half of the twentieth-century, particularly in the 1930s and 1940s – a time when religions needed to harmonize with the “Imperial Way” or risk legal retribution – historians at Imperial Universities highlighted Buddhism’s historical service to the state in early Japan and emphasized the need for the government to regulate religion to control its excesses. From the post-war period, scholars voiced concern that many aspects of Nara Buddhism possessed an eerie similarity to the wartime era, a period that they viewed with contempt. While the interpretations of scholars in each period differed, they all treated historical writings as a means to critique the present and envision a brighter tomorrow.

1. Nostalgic History in a Period of Change

Modern historical writing on Buddhism first emerged in the Meiji period. The earliest Meiji histories of Japanese Buddhism were organized to highlight the Buddhist events under each ruler’s reign, thus taking an emperor-centric view of Japanese Buddhism as a whole. This historiographical methodology, which is traceable to ancient Chinese models, shows that the modern origins of historical studies of Buddhism were inseparable from the imperial project.

Beyond these examples of emperor-centrism as a general historiographical mode, many Buddhists writing historical surveys in the 1890s treated the Nara period with particular nostalgia: they viewed the close relations between state and

5. By modern historical studies of Japanese Buddhism, I refer to scholarly projects with Buddhism in Japan as their main focus that aim for impartiality and were produced and consumed outside of traditional monastic centers. Murakami Senshō outlined the historical approach in the opening issues of *Bukkyō shirin*, the first Japanese periodical to focus on Buddhist history; see Sueki 2004: 93-100 and 2005: 12-18, as well as Klaatu 2008: 204. There were, of course, earlier historical works on Buddhism dating back at least as far as the medieval period by monks such as Gyōnen and Kokan Shiren. For Gyōnen, see Blum 2002. For Kokan Shiren, see Bielefeldt 1997 and Ury 1970. Gyōnen’s writings were picked up by modern Buddhist reformers interested in forging a new transsectarian Buddhism; for this, see Ketelaar 1990: 177-206.
6. Here, I refer to Tajima 1884 and Ōuchi 1884. These works are also discussed by Orion Klaatu; see Klaatu 2011: 77-79 and 2012: 85-86. Both figures were active in Buddhist reform movements and were deeply interested in the service of Japanese Buddhism to the state. For some background on these figures in English, see Thelle 1987: 103-107 and 196-197.
7. This organizational principle centered on the emperor can be found in medieval histories of Buddhism as well. For example, see the annals section of Kokan Shiren’s *Genkō shakusho*. 
religion of eighth-century Japan as an ideal to be emulated. For these scholars, the Nara period represented a source of national pride worthy of imitation. In an 1891 text entitled *Great Treatise on Establishing Religion* (*Rikkyō tairon* 立教大論), the Sōtō priest Kuriyama Taion 栗山泰音 (1860-1937) highlighted the prosperity of Buddhism under the patronage of the court after arguing in his preface that contemporary Buddhists could strengthen the foundations of their religion by turning to the past. In a section entitled, “The Flourishing of Buddhist Practices (*Butsuji no kōryū* 佛事の興隆)” Kuriyama praises this historical support of Buddhism as far superior to contemporary political attitudes toward religion, arguing that the lavish state sponsorship during the eighth century offered an alternative to the “contemporary fuss (*yakamashiki kyō* 喧しき今日) over freedom of religion (*shinkyō no jiyū* 信教の自由)” in the Meiji period (Murakami 1891: 55).

To understand this assessment, it is necessary to recall that Kuriyama’s book appeared less than one year after the promulgation of the Meiji constitution, which enacted a clause guaranteeing limited freedom of religion. The precise boundaries of the law and its future were still a matter of debate amongst Buddhist activists and politicians in 1891. Kuriyama’s text aimed at “establishing religion” represents a piece of these conversations. The historical survey at the beginning of the book, in fact, provides a background for Kuriyama to address many contemporary issues at length including religious freedom. While he was not completely opposed to the religious freedom clause, he expressed concerns regarding tensions between freedom of religion and responsibilities to the state (the latter of which was of greater importance to him) and about potential Christian abuses of the clause with regard to education. These anti-Christian concerns were prompted by the famed Uchimura Kanzō 内村鑑三 (1861-1930) lèse-majesté incident from a few months earlier in which a Christian school teacher refused to bow before the signature of the Imperial Rescript on Education. The *Great Treatise* as a whole had an anti-Christian angle. Its main theses provide insight into his assessment of the Nara period; in general

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8. I will refer to this figure as Kuriyama Taion, a name he is better known by. Kuriyama served as the director of the Sōtō 曹洞 headquarters and played a major role in shaping Buddhist debates on issues such as clerical marriage (Jaffe 2001: 220-223). I will cite his monograph *Rikkyō tairon* as Murakami 1891, since he published under this name. It should be noted that while his tone is undoubtedly praiseworthy of Nara Buddhism and views it as foundational for later developments, he does stress that a deeper realization of Buddhism had to wait for Saichō and Kūkai.


10. For Kuriyama’s discussion of freedom of religion, see Murakami 1891: 165-171.

11. For Kuriyama’s discussion of the disrespect of Christians at ceremonial readings of the Rescript of Education, an obvious reference to the Uchimura incident, see Murakami 1891: 168. For this incident and its relationship with debates over religious freedom, see Abe 1969.
terms, Kuriyama “attacked Christianity…he severely criticized the above mentioned heretical actions of Christians in schools, considering them a mixture of religious superstition and education, and explained the reasons for the quick and easy unification of Buddhism with the national character.”12 The Nara period provided a historical model for this latter goal.

An 1892 historical survey by Katō Yūichirō (better known as Katō Totsudō; 1870-1949), entitled History of Japanese Buddhism (Nihon Bukkyō shi 日本佛教史), built upon Kuriyama’s analysis and similarly pointed to the Nara period as an ideal to be imitated.13 This similarity is perhaps unsurprising, as Katō (1892: 3), who was an active voice in Meiji Buddhist journals, cited Kuriyama’s Treatise as an inspiration. In History of Japanese Buddhism, Katō argued that Buddhism in the Nara period represented “the state religion (kokkyō 国教) and held power over state education (kokka kyōiku 国家教育)” (Katō 1892: 15-16). For Katō, this was a positive feature of the age. His choice of the word kokkyō, a term that had a semantic range from national teaching to state religion, is significant. It had been used a few decades earlier in a massive campaign by the government to assert a radically reformulated version of Shintō as the “National Teaching” through the appointment of doctrinal instructors and the creation of a network of teaching centers.14 By the 1890s, bureaucrats had abandoned this National Teaching campaign, but some Buddhist organizations began to adopt the term to bolster their position. Katō, therefore, appropriated the phrase kokkyō and used the Nara period as a model to assert Buddhism’s ancient role as a teaching promoted and protected by the state. The creation of a “National Teaching” posed a threat to Buddhists in the 1870s, but it became an opportunity for those writing in the 1890s.

Similarly, in describing Heian Buddhism, Katō viewed Saichō as representing aristocratic Buddhism and Kūkai as supporting the Buddhism of the common man (heimin 平民). As we will see, later scholars would view the gradual popularization of Buddhism as the realization of true Buddhism, but, as Mori Shinnosuke (2013: 7-8) has argued, these were mutually complementary in Katō’s History of Japanese Buddhism.15 While state support alone may have been insufficient in Katō’s eyes, it was also not an obstacle to be overcome. Statist interpretations appear in other political activities of Katō as well, such as his support of an 1899...

13. For more on Katō Totsudō, see the article by Jolyon Thomas in this issue, as well as Thomas 2014: 182-214.
15. Mori has pointed out that slightly later writings of Katō viewed aristocratic Buddhism as inadequate for the hearts of the people, but he still lacked the teleological narrative that understands Kamakura Buddhism as the realization of popular Buddhism seen in other authors, as discussed below. See Mori 2013: 8-9.
bill proposing stricter state control of religion.\textsuperscript{16} Again, the Nara period provided historical justification for these causes. Katō saw state regulation and elite support as potentially positive forces.

These reformers nostalgically turned to the strong state support of Buddhism in the Nara period as an alternative to their present troubles, when many voices attacked their religion as antiquated and advocated a strict separation of church and state. This sentiment, which understood the past as an ideal that could be enacted in the present is captured in the educator Sawayanagi Masatarō’s \textsuperscript{17} preface to Katō’s survey: “For Buddhism to flourish, restoration (\textit{fukko} [復古]) [is needed], not reform (\textit{kairyō} [改良])” (Katō 1892: preface ii [page numbers not listed in original]).\textsuperscript{17} This statement advocates a turning back of the clocks rather than the construction of a new tradition. Part of the reason modern Buddhist activists focused on the state’s promotion of Buddhism in the Nara period was as a means to critique contemporary power configurations in which state support was becoming increasingly withdrawn and to offer historically grounded alternatives. While a great deal of attention on Meiji Buddhism has focused on efforts to radically transform the tradition – a topic we will turn to momentarily – the writings of these scholars active in the 1890s reveal a dream of restoring Buddhism to the status of its glorious past predating modern fusses over state interference and religious freedom.\textsuperscript{18}

2. Overcoming the Past through History

Figures such as Katō and Kuriyama did not monopolize Meiji historiographical discourse. Other reformers and scholars took a more critical perspective of the past that served their broader efforts to purify Japanese Buddhism from secular corruptions. While Katō and Kuriyama saw Nara Buddhism as an ideal to be emulated, others viewed the past as a lesson whose excesses and mistakes could prove instructive for the future. In fact the critical tone found in more recent

\textsuperscript{16} For this bill and Katō’s general support of it, see Thomas 2014: 138-142, esp. note 49.

\textsuperscript{17} The choice by Katō to have Sawayanagi write the preface is significant. Sawayanagi was an influential educator and official in the Ministry of Education, who advocated state support of a public school system and viewed Buddhist ethics as a key component of moral training and pedagogy. See Kobayashi 1990: 48-49. For a brief overview of his life, see Ejima 2012.

\textsuperscript{18} This is not to say that these scholars were opposed to change, just that they viewed the Nara period more as a model than scholars like Sakaino, whom I will turn to below. Kuriyama is explicit about the need for reform throughout his book. Sawayanagi’s distinction between restoration and reform is a useful heuristic, though the realities on the ground are far messier for all the figures addressed in this article.
attempts by post-war scholars such as Futaba Kenkō and Inoue Mitsusada – two historians to be treated below – have a longer history, first appearing in the writings of Meiji reformers.

Of the historians advancing a critical and reformist agenda, Sakaino Kōyō 境野黄洋 (1877-1933) may have been the most influential. He was a founding member of the New Buddhist movement and went on to teach at Komazawa University and serve as president of Toyo University. While Sakaino is remembered as one of the leading twentieth-century scholars of Chinese Buddhism, he also wrote extensively on the Nara period throughout his career. In an 1897 article published in *Grove of Buddhist History* (Bukkyō shirin 佛教史林), Sakaino set out to define the “distinguishing characteristic” (tokusei 特性) of Nara and Heian (794-1185) Buddhism. Perhaps unsurprisingly, he claimed that Nara Buddhism was set apart from other periods by its conflation with politics. But in contrast to other Meiji scholars, who viewed lavish state support of Buddhism in the Nara period as the pinnacle of proper patronage, Sakaino provocatively suggested that Buddhism’s expansion under the sovereigns Shōmu 聖武 (r. 724-749) and Kōken/Shōtoku 孝謙/称徳 (r. 749-758 and 764-770) marked the beginning of its decline (suitai 衰頽). He argued that Nara Buddhism with its focus on politics and this-worldly practices had not yet reached the foundational conception (konpon gainen 根本概念) of Buddhism, which he defined as focused on achieving enlightenment. Although Sakaino viewed Prince Shōtoku’s promotion of Buddhism as an auspicious start for the religion in Japan, he characterized the Nara period as a whole by the decay (fuhai 腐敗) of the clergy, language that we will see was echoed in Tsuji for quite


20. The following discussion draws primarily from Sakaino 1897, but he began to develop these ideas in two earlier articles also published in *Grove of Buddhist History*. See Sakaino 1896a and b. Some of these ideas also appear in chapters from a large uncompleted collaborative history of Japanese Buddhism that Sakaino compiled with Murakami Senshō and Washio Junkyō 鳥尾順敬 (1868-1941). See Murakami et al. 1897: 594-643. This was intended to be a five volume set, as indicated by an advertisement in the back of the first volume, but subsequent volumes were never published.

21. Sakaino’s views of the Kamakura period cannot be treated in detail here, but it is important to note that his criticism of the Nara period functions as part of a broader narrative glorifying the Kamakura period as the time when true Buddhism emerged in Japan. This narrative has been repeatedly challenged in recent years. For some representative works in English, see Dobbins 1998 and Stone 1999, esp. 55-94 and 190-236 and 2006: 39-47.
different reasons. In short, for Sakaino, state patronage of Buddhism represented a grave threat that led to the corruption of the Buddha’s teachings and provided a cautionary tale of how state intervention can ruin a religion. While Sakaino and other scholars’ theories of decline in the Tokugawa period are far better known, historians throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth century crafted narratives of decline followed by reform that reflected their views of themselves as heroes reviving the tradition from centuries of deterioration in the early modern period. These tales of decline served as a foil used in contrast to the idealized visions embraced by Buddhist reformers.

Sakaino’s writings on the Nara period must be understood with relation to his larger political and ecclesiastical projects. With regard to politics, Sakaino positioned himself as a leading opponent to making Buddhism an officially recognized religion (kōninkyō 公認教), an opinion that put him at odds with major figures such as Ishikawa Shuntai 石川舜台 (1842-1931) and Chikazumi Jōkan 近角常観 (1870-1941). His criticisms of the union of religion and governance in his historical and political writings should be viewed as one aspect of his broader effort to redefine the role of religion with respect to politics in Meiji Japan. Sakaino’s views were in line with the official position of the New Buddhists – a group that Sakaino played a leadership role in – as is made clear in one of the movement’s six founding principles, which claimed that “the members reject any form of political protection and intervention.” According to Jolyon Thomas (2014: 163), this clause was added “in response to the clerical push to make Buddhism an officially recognized religion (which founding members read as an abrogation of the principle of fairness between religions and a dangerous invitation for the state to meddle in private religious matters).”

22. Klautau 2008 and 2012: 183-296 provides the best historiographical analysis of Tokugawa theories of decline. He discusses Sakaino’s views briefly. See Klautau 2008: 286 and 2012: 226. Interestingly, Kuriyama Taion, discussed above as someone who views Nara Buddhism in generally favorable terms, also asserts a narrative of Tokugawa decline. Katō Totsudō, on the other hand, is more reserved, indicating the ways Tokugawa support of Buddhism contributed to keeping out Christianity, while at the same time, pointing out many of the shortcomings of the Buddhist clergy during this era. But a detailed analysis of their treatments of Tokugawa Buddhism is outside the scope of this article. For their views, see Katō 1892: 78-87 and Murakami 1891: 94-101.

23. For more on Sakaino’s and other members of the group that became the Fraternity of New Buddhists views on religious freedom and official recognition, see Thomas 2014: 160-173.

But why would a key figure in a reform movement calling itself New Buddhism turn to history at all? Perhaps surprisingly, the strategy was not uncommon as New Buddhists used their journal and other publication venues to advocate for historical studies. In fact, the very nature of Buddhism as a historically formed tradition provided the foundations for the New Buddhist movement. Sakaino made this point in an article, “Historical Buddhism” (Rekishiteki Bukkyō 历史的佛教) published in the group’s journal, New Buddhism, where he differentiated approaches that treat Buddhism as historical, i.e. developing and changing over time, from mythic (densetsu teki 傳説的) ones, which, he wrote, stultify the potential for change. As Sakaino (1902: 444) saw it, the potential of historical approaches had implications for the future, not only the past:

Firstly, to say that Buddhism changes historically means that it is expected that in the future too it will have to change with the progress of human wisdom and the advancement of society. Therefore, secondly, if we take it that Buddhism is something that changes and advances in the past and future, it is an inevitable necessity that Buddhist doctrines of the past must be abandoned and reconstructed into a form that accords with the times.

To historicize Buddhism and devalue its mythic qualities was not merely a product of modern empiricism and rationalism. Rather, it had a pragmatic quality: namely, it justified the entire enterprise of the Buddhist reformation envisioned by New Buddhists. The very possibility of creating a new Buddhism depended on a historical approach to religion that recognized the possibility for transformation over time. For a New Buddhism to emerge, it had to first leave behind its mythical quality and enter the realm of history. If Buddhism lacked history, it could not change and, therefore, could not be reformed. For the New Buddhists, historical inquiry served as a handmaiden to progress.

3. State Buddhism, Buddhist States, and National History

As different as their conclusions may have been, Katō, Kuriyama, and Sakaino all wrote from inside the Buddhist tradition as reformers who sought to carve out a new space for their religion within the Meiji state. But Buddhist reformers represented a small fraction of authors writing historical works. Buddhism also played a central role in the scholarship of those in the field of national history.

25. Sakaino began to discuss historical methods in a different 1894 piece with the same title, but the discussion that follows focuses on the 1902 work.
26. Others affiliated with the new Buddhist movement explored similar themes regarding the historicity of Buddhism. For example, see Katō 1900.
(kokushi 国史), a discipline that emerged in the Meiji period and was closely connected to Imperial Universities. In fact, it was a national historian who first coined the term “state Buddhism (kokka Bukkyō 国家佛教).”

National history as a field turned to the past to find historical justifications of the modern emperor-centered state. As Lisa Yoshikawa (2007: 41) has argued, the Nara period played a central role in this project from its earliest days:

> From the very beginning in 1868, the new leadership looked to the Nara-Heian era (ca.645-1185) as the model for the ‘restoration of imperial rule’ (osei fukko). During this early era, the imperial court had stood at the pinnacle of the state, which the Meiji leaders claimed to be reviving. By spotlighting the five Nara-Heian centuries as the national ideal, the leaders immediately designated that period a seminal moment in the state-sanctioned National History, when the imperial court was the heart of Japanese polity.

But the Nara period also posed problems that National Historians had to respond to, as it was also a time when kings adopted a foreign religion, Buddhism, a move that ran counter to the desired image of the emperor symbolizing an indigenous tradition impervious to foreign influence. As James Ketelaar (1990: 194) has succinctly summarized: “Within Meiji era national histories Buddhism figured as an unpleasant yet inescapable guest.” The state Buddhism model, as it emerged in the field of National History, helped domesticate this foreign religion by considering it a key component of the Japanification of Buddhism.

The term “state Buddhism” in reference to the Nara period first appeared in the work of Kuroita Katsumi 黒板勝美 (1874-1946), a professor at Tokyo Imperial University and chief architect of the field of national history, whose “priority from the very beginning was to build a history of Japan around the state-sanctioned imperial myth” (Yoshikawa 2007: 75). His writings on Nara Buddhism first appeared in a single volume 1908 work, Research on National History (Kokushi no kenkyū 国史の研究), a project he would revise in three editions published over thirty years.
years. Here, Kuroita (1908: 331-334) emphasized the court’s role in promoting Buddhism and commissioning artistic masterpieces. He claimed that Buddhism synthesized with a Japanese spirit to create magnificent works of art such as the Śākyamuni at Hōryū-ji’s Golden Hall. Kuroita, like other Meiji authors, solved the foreign origins problem by showing how Buddhism became subsumed within Japanese culture with the implication that in doing so Japan was able to create works of art that surpassed anything on the continent in aesthetic splendor.

These aesthetic attributes were not the only feature that made Buddhism Japanese; over time, he began to understand state Buddhism as also representing a part of the Japanification of the religion. Following the artistic overview of the first edition, Kuroita added that other developments similarly led to the Japanification of Buddhism: “Just like these [aesthetic developments], Buddhism also had already come to carry something of a Japanese flavor” (1908: 331), which he defined as this-worldly benefits such as tranquility of the realm and other-worldly benefits such as aspirations for the Pure Land. In the second edition published between 1913-1918, Kuroita (1918: 131) was more direct, as he appended the first usage of the exact term “state Buddhism” (kokka Bukkyō 国家佛教) to the above quotation: “Just like these [aesthetic developments], Buddhism also had already come to carry something of a Japanese flavor and finally became something that can be called state Buddhism.” Here, an Indic religion became Japanese through its service to the state.

While Kuroita hints at issues related to state Buddhism in the early editions and introduces the term in the 1918 text, he truly develops them in the third, which was published between 1931-1936 during a time of increased militarism. This edition made the term “state Buddhism” central to Kuroita’s interpretive framework. From the 1930s, he began to stress the role of Buddhism in uniting the citizenry to support the empire. To this end, Kuroita’s third edition focused on exemplary projects such as the Great Buddha Hall at Tōdai-ji, which benefited from support by the emperor and commoners alike. Kuroita (1932: 183) described this project as “uniting all of the people of the nation together into a fellowship (chishiki 知識) composed of comrades (dōshi 同志) giving alms out of faith.” For Kuroita, state Buddhism was an essentially positive endeavor: it provided a model of how the people of the nation could selflessly join together in fellowship around the emperor to achieve greatness. This message would have surely resonated with readers during the rising imperialism and nationalism of the 1930s.

Kuroita gave substantial attention to the positive features of state Buddhism, but he also pointed out the dangers of monks meddling in state affairs. Even the 1908 and 1913-1918 editions painted a picture that was not entirely rosy. Here,

30. Here, Kuroita draws upon an earlier tradition of scholarship that emphasizes the Japanification of foreign art forms such as Buddhist sculpture as a means of asserting a “national genius.” See Tanaka 2001. I would like to thank Micah Auerback for sharing this article with me.
he cautiously referred to “state Buddhist governance” (kokkateki Bukkyō seiji 国家的佛教政治), of the eighth century in reference to the Dōkyō incident, when a monk allegedly aspired to the throne, and cites this time as a period when excessive attention to Buddhism risked impoverishing the state. Kuroita (1932: 182-193) expanded on these warnings in the 1932 edition, where he distinguished “state Buddhism (kokka Bukkyō 國家佛教)” from a “Buddhist state (Bukkyō kokka 佛教國家).” This binary distinction established an ideal – state Buddhism – and a clearly articulated risk – a Buddhist state. According to Kuroita, “the monastic governance (sōryo seiji 僧侶政治) that appeared in this “Buddhist state…was a perverse form of governance (hentai seiji 變態政治) that was nearly unprecedented in our nation’s history…the emergence of a Buddhist state was a crisis for the national polity” (1932: 192-3).

For Kuroita, a scholar with commitments shaped by the militarized climate of the 1930s, his discipline – National History, and his institutional affiliation – Tokyo Imperial University, Buddhism should be subservient to imperial interests. His models of “state Buddhism” and a “Buddhist state” clearly articulated his normative vision: the state should quite literally come first. An inversion could only be understood as a perversion.

Buddhism was a secondary concern within Kuroita’s narrative, which focused on political and cultural history, but it took center stage in the voluminous writings of another national historian, Tsuji Zennosuke 辻善之助 (1877-1955). Tsuji, a colleague of Kuroita’s at Tokyo Imperial University and a leading figure in the early days of the Historiographical Institute, is often considered the most influential figure in establishing a secularized and empirical academic field of Japanese Buddhist history. While Buddhism was central to his project, he, like Kuroita, wrote from the perspective of a national historian employed at an imperial university rather than as an active reformer from within the Buddhist tradition.

Tsuji’s most sustained treatment of Nara Buddhism appeared in a short 1940 monograph appropriately titled State and Buddhism in the Nara Period (Nara jidai ni okeru kokka to Bukkyō 奈良時代に於ける國家と佛教). Tsuji began his narrative with a telling preamble on Prince Shōtoku. In Tsuji’s narrative, Prince Shōtoku made “Japanese Buddhism” Japanese by unifying it with the state: “The Prince strived

32. For an overview of Tsuji’s career, see Brownlee 1997: 155-168 and Klautau 2012: 244-264.
33. That is not to say that Tsuji was indifferent to the fate of modern Japanese Buddhism, only that he better masked his interests under the cloak of empiricism than the earlier reformers. As Orion Klautau and Hayashi Makoto have argued, Tsuji maintained an idealized version of the Buddhism that informed his historical scholarship. In English, see Klautau 2008: 288-295. In particular, his father’s influence as a fervent believer of Jōdo shinshū seems to have been significant; see Klautau 2012: 258-259 and Hayashi 1982: 67-68.
Lowe: States of "State Buddhism" 83

to establish a Japanese form of Buddhism (Nihonteki Bukkyō 日本的佛教) in which religion and politics were unified by assimilating and amalgamating continental Buddhism to the spirit of the Japanese people (1940: 7). Since Tsuji, like Kuroita, viewed the amalgamation of state and Buddhism as a mark of Japaneseness, Prince Shōtoku’s importance lay in his institution of reforms that served to make Buddhism palatable to a loyal Japanese citizenry.34 Since to be Japanese required identifying oneself as part of an empire, for Buddhism to become Japanese, it too would need to bow down before its master, the state.35 Only by doing so, in the view of Tsuji, could Buddhism be accepted by the people of Japan.

In Tsuji’s understanding, the unification of state and Buddhism began with Prince Shōtoku but came to fruition during the late seventh and eighth centuries. For example, Tsuji (1940: 20-21) proudly noted that the compound “aikoku 愛國,” which later came to mean patriotism, first appeared in the Chronicles of Japan (Nihon shoki 日本書紀; 720 CE) account of Ōtomobe no Hakama 大伴部博麻, a seventh-century soldier who sold himself into slavery to support the war cause on the continent. This citation surely had resonance with contemporary readers as battles raged in China in the 1930s and 1940s. But Tsuji, like other before him, reserved his most lavish praise for Shōmu’s edict for the casting of the Great Buddha at Tōdai-ji, a potent symbol of the glorious possibilities when state and religion combine forces:

The magnificence of this august spirit was not simply that it was issued from the mindset of imperial glory, but that it was really an expression of the splendid zeitgeist of the age, and it truly showed the strength of a flourishing national consciousness of the citizens’ self-awakening. From this disposition, from this spirit, Tōdai-ji was constructed, the provincial temples were established, and Buddhism prospered as the true Dharma of state protection (1940: 89).

Beyond imperial splendor and self-awakening, Buddhism in the Nara period benefited both state and populace more broadly: “it was the creed of the time that Buddhism was the basis for the state’s prosperity and the people’s welfare (kokka ryūshō jinmin fukuri 國家隆昌人民福利)” (Tsuji 1940: 85). As was the case with Kuroita in the 1930s, Tsuji saw state Buddhism as a means to unite the state and its people, a move largely absent from the first two editions of Kuroita’s Research on National History, published in the first two decades of the twentieth century. This

34. For these claims about statism as a distinguishing feature of the Japanese, see Tsuji 1944: 1-5.
35. Of course from a historical perspective, the notion that imperial patronage made Japan unique is dubious. This is a common feature of Buddhism in diverse geographic regions and historical periods.
attention by National Historians to Buddhism’s role in unifying the throne and the populace should be understood as part of broader political efforts to mobilize the people in the increasingly militarized climate of 1930s and 1940s Japan.36

Tsuji’s account does not end with these grand pronouncements, however, but instead transitions to a cautionary tale in a final brief chapter to *State and Buddhism in the Nara Period*, entitled “The Resulting Evil of Buddhist Politics (*Bukkyō seiji no yohei* 佛教政治の餘弊),” that closely mirrors the chapter “The Decay and Decline of the Temples and the Clergy (*Jiin sōryo no fuhai daraku* 寺院僧侶の腐敗堕落),” from Tsuji’s ten volume survey of Japanese Buddhism, the first of which appeared in 1944.37 In this chapter, Tsuji pointed out the potential for damage when Buddhism strays from its role as a religion in service of the empire. Following other scholars before him, Tsuji heuristically divided the Nara period into an early era and a later one.38 While the early period represented a Golden Age of Nara, for Tsuji and others, the latter half demonstrated the threat of an insubordinate Buddhism. Like Kuroita, Tsuji turned to the famed Dōkyō incident, when, in his view, the proper hierarchy was subverted to the extent that it was impossible to see whether Buddhism functioned on behalf of politics or politics on behalf of Buddhism (Tsuji 1940: 89-90). His argument climaxed with memorable language of sacrifice: “It was forgotten that Buddhism is supposed to protect the state; instead the state was offered as a sacrifice to Buddhism. In terms of the evils of Buddhist politics (*Bukkyō seiji* 佛教政治), this must be considered the pinnacle” (Tsuji 1940: 100; 1944: 230). In this version of the state Buddhism model, the apex of evil was not that Buddhism was political, but that its aspirations exceeded what was deemed appropriate.

Tsuji emphasized that Buddhist politics not only endangered the state, but also threatened the integrity of the clergy. He described the monks of the late Nara period with a set of terms he more famously used in his depictions of

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36. The publication of Tsuji’s book coincided with nationwide celebrations of the 2,600th anniversary of the founding of Japan, an event similarly connected to both the writings of National Historians and broader discourses about uniting imperial subjects en masse. For this, see Ruoff 2010.

37. Tsuji 1940: 89-104 and 1944: 214-231. In fact, in what appear to be drafts of this series, here titled *Nihon Bukkyō gaishi* in his archives at the Himeji City Museum of Literature (*Himeji Bungakukan* 姫路文学館), Tsuji initially left spaces to add passages from his earlier article and then directly cut and pasted these passages in. See Himeji Bungakukan, 39-02-000010 and 39-02-000017.

38. The earlier period runs from Genmei (r. 707-715) to Genshō (r. 715-724). The later period begins with the reign of Emperor Shōmu (r. 724-749) and continues through Shōtoku (r. 764-770). Under Tsuji’s idiosyncratic chronology, the early period, which he viewed in a positive light, lasted only seventeen years. The latter period, which he characterized as one of decline for the clergy, spanned forty-six years.
the Tokugawa age: corrupt (akuhei 悪弊), declining (daraku 堕落), and decayed (fubai 腐敗). Somewhat surprisingly, however, Tsuji (1944: 214) attributed this slide to the gradual “loosening” (yurumu弛む) of state control (tōsei統制). The decay of Buddhism, therefore, did not result from the fact that religion and the state were too close, as is typical in some models by Meiji reformers and postwar historians. Instead, greater state control was needed for the religion to flourish. State regulation, in Tsuji’s 1940s view, may have been a bitter pill, but it was one that Buddhists had to swallow.

4. The War on State Buddhism in Post-war Japan

In marked contrast to interwar academic discourse, post-war scholars active in the 1960s and 1970s valorized Buddhist resistance to state control. These scholars wrote in a time of deep reflection over the excesses of wartime Japan, when the state regulated religious activities with an often heavy hand. Historians active in this period were deeply aware of the dangers of state power and began to turn increasing attention to “the people,” a vaguely defined social category described with terms such as minshū民衆, shomin庶民, and taishū大衆 used in contrast to elites. As Carol Gluck (1993: 85) has summarized: 

[The people] were invoked as the new protagonists of history, as if to replace the state that had recently been so powerful. This renewed search for agents of social and political change apart from the state characterized postwar historical consciousness in many countries responding to the mid-twentieth-century state, which had wrought such harm to its own people and those it colonized or subjugated.

If history in the 1960s and 1970s had an ideology, it was clearly one deeply committed to glorifying the people as the agents of change and denigrating the state as inherently repressive.

These post-war moves toward a distrust of the state and a valorization of the populace also appeared in Buddhist historical scholarship, which began to emphasize resistance to state control. Some of the earliest expressions of this Buddhist resistance narrative emerged in Shin Buddhist (Jōdo shinshū浄土真}

39. For example, see Tsuji 1940: 89 and 100-101 and 1944: 214.
40. This language of decay and decline is similar to that used by Tsuji in his more famous thesis of the decline of Buddhism in the Tokugawa period. The reasoning behind his critique, however, is almost the opposite of that used in his assessment of Tokugawa Buddhism. For the Tokugawa period, he claimed that the parishioner system endorsed by the state contributed to a laxity amongst the clergy. For the Nara period, the loosening of state control resulted in a decline. These tensions warrant further research.
86

Japanese Religions 39 (1 & 2)

41. In fact, Miyazaki wrote the preface to Futaba’s book.

42. Miyazaki 1955: 426. I would like to thank James Dobbins for sharing this reference with me; he originally cites it in Dobbins 1989: 192, n. 21 (Dobbins cites the 1956 republication of this 1955 article).

43. Futaba’s 1962 monograph represents his most sustained treatment, of ritsuryō/anti-ritsuryō Buddhism, but he began using these terms slightly earlier. See Futaba 1960 and 1961.
Museum of Japanese History – cited Futaba’s work as influential in shaping his research on Buddhism and the state. Inoue’s definition of state Buddhism appeared in the second chapter of his widely read *Buddhism and the Early Japanese State* (*Nihon kodai no kokka to Bukkyō* 日本古代の国家と仏教), first published in 1971. Here, Inoue outlined three features of Buddhism during the *ritsuryō* era that defined it as state Buddhism. First, the state controlled temples and the clergy. Second, the state protected and promoted Buddhism. Finally, Buddhism was valued more for its magical powers in bringing prosperity to the realm than for its philosophical insights (Inoue 1971: 3).

Inoue’s narrative did not end with this definition. If state Buddhism was the villain for Inoue, Kamakura reformers such as Hōnen (1133-1212) and Shinran were clearly the heroes for freeing Buddhism from Heian-period state protection Buddhism (*chingo kokka Bukkyō* 鎮護国家仏教). Buddhism only reached its full potential when it spread to the common people (*minshū* 民衆) for the first time through the activities of these Kamakura reformers. In contrast to Tsuji, Inoue valued independence from state control; for him, it enabled Buddhism to flourish. And while Inoue recognized that monks such as Nichiren (1222-1282) and Ippen (1239-1289) maintained an interest in the state, he claimed that these thinkers focused their attention on an ideal Buddhist realm (*kokudo* 国土) rather than an actual nation state (*kokka* 国家) (Inoue 1971, esp. 396-397; Inoue 2004: 264), thus divorcing their projects from nationalism. Inoue’s broader narrative of Japanese Buddhist history, therefore, described a gradual development from state Buddhism in the Nara period to reform movements in the Kamakura period, the so-called Golden Age of Japanese Buddhism.

In this narrative, state Buddhism represented the corruption against which the Kamakura Buddhists reacted, just as the post-war period signified a chance for Japan to rebuild in the wake of failed imperialism. It is useful to mine Inoue’s writings on the war to see how his feelings shaped his scholarship and uncover his ideological commitments. While Inoue’s true opinions about the state during the war years are impossible to recover, the retrospective narrative he provides in his memoir reveals a distrust of scholarly norms in wartime Japan. For example, Inoue claimed that his suspicion of wartime imperialistic tendencies amongst professors

44. Inoue discusses Futaba’s influence in his memoirs. See Inoue 2004: 255.
45. While some scholars in the Meiji period had placed value on the spread of Buddhism to the commoners (often referred to as *heimin* 平民) as a positive development, the idea that the flourishing of Buddhism was intimately connected to the religion reaching the populace emerged most strongly in the post-war period. For a detailed assessment, see Mori 2013: 3-41. I would like to thank Orion Klautau for introducing me to this research. This is part of a larger trend in post-war historical scholarship to focus attention on non-elites. See Gluck 1978 and 1993: 85-86.
At Tokyo Imperial University was the reason he chose Watsuji Tetsurō (1889-1960), who taught ethics, as his graduate advisor, rather than the historian Hiraizumi Kiyoshi (1895-1984), who was known as a zealous supporter of the imperial project (Inoue 2004: 38). He also related the hardships his family underwent during the war and expressed the satisfaction he felt at Japan’s surrender: “The feeling of liberation from militarism was far stronger than any deep sorrow of defeat” (Inoue 2004: 65). These suspicions of militarism and state involvement in religion that form the core of Inoue’s post-war identity shine through his historical scholarship on the Nara period. The close relationship between state and religion in the eighth century seemed frighteningly familiar to Inoue. Just as he saw post-war Japan overcoming the militarism of the previous generation, he envisioned Kamakura Buddhist reformers liberating their religion from the clutches of the state.

Inoue’s basic suspicions regarding the state have been difficult to jettison. Even his sharpest critics share his basic sensibilities. For example, Yoshida Kazuhiko (esp. 1995, 2006a, 2006b), the fiercest opponent of the state Buddhism model active today, has convincingly argued that Buddhism spread to “the masses” long before the Kamakura period. In addition to the Buddhism of the state (kokka no Bukkyō 国家の仏教), Yoshida has identified several other distinct forms of Nara Buddhism including the Buddhism of aristocrats (kizoku no Bukkyō 貴族の仏教), the Buddhism of provincial magnates (chihō gōzoku no Bukkyō 地方豪族の仏教), and the Buddhism of the masses (minshū no Bukkyō 民衆の仏教). Of these, he has placed the greatest emphasis on that of the masses. Yoshida has clearly demonstrated the diversity of ancient Japanese Buddhism; it was by no means limited to the ruling powers. But in doing so, Yoshida simply changed the timeline for the emergence of “popular Buddhism.” He left the basic value system intact. Freedom from the state remained the ideal, and the common people (minshū 民衆) continued on as the hero. The ideology of post-war scholarship took the strict separation of church and state for granted, held a postwar conception of religious freedom, and valorized the common folk. This is true for both proponents and critics of the state Buddhism model. It may be a different set of values compared to wartime scholarship, but it is no less ideological.

5. Conclusion

In spite of recent criticisms, Inoue’s state Buddhism model remains influential today. According to Kamikawa Michio (b. 1960), it has become the standard explanation (tsūsetsu 伝説) for understanding the Nara period (Kamikawa 2007: 20-22). But it is necessary to remember that Inoue was not the only voice active in defining state Buddhism. From as early as the 1890s, figures supporting a closer role between religion and state admired official patronage in the Nara period,
while critics, such as Sakaino, attacked Nara Buddhism as corrupt precisely because it had a cozy relationship with the state. In the interwar years, scholars turned their attention from the state support of religion to the service Buddhism could supply the nation. The only evil stemming from politicized forms of Buddhism, for these scholars, was when Buddhism forgot its proper place. The more familiar versions of the state Buddhism model authored by Futaba and Inoue emerged in the post-war period, precisely at a time when suspicions peaked over governmental control of religion.

The purpose of this historiographical overview has not been to suggest that past generations of scholars invented the state Buddhism model out of thin air—it would be impossible to deny that eighth-century legal codes were established to regulate the conduct of monks and nuns or that the state promoted Buddhism partially from a desire for apotropaic protection and ideological justification. These facts are indisputable. Nor have I tried to support a particular interpretation as the most historically defensible. Instead, I have argued that the tone of the debate and the interpretation of the evidence regarding state Buddhism have been shaped by the political and religious challenges posed to each successive generation of scholars and reformers.

More generally, I have rejected a progressive view of historiography that sees each generation developing a better understanding of the past. While I share many of Futaba and Inoue’s suspicions about the objectivity of wartime scholarship, I would also suggest that their postwar commitments, perhaps perversely, caused equal violence to premodern religions. For one, the categories of state and popular oversimplified far more complex social organizations and processes. Moreover, these narratives imposed late twentieth-century liberal ideas regarding separation of church and state and freedom of religion on eighth-century cases, an inevitably poor fit for a time in which state patronage of Buddhism and the regulation of religion were largely taken as givens. These ideals are not objective and universal values but ones particular to the postwar period. The postwar assumptions have become so integral to our understanding of the past that they remain largely unquestioned. Even Inoue’s critics, who have illuminated the importance of ordinary folk working independently from the clutches of official institutions, still tend to portray the state as the bad guy, valorizing freedom as an ideal. It is only because most scholars in the twenty-first century share many of Inoue’s assumptions that we fail to recognize their particular historical origins. And it is precisely because these values are widely shared that they have become so pernicious to the understanding of premodern periods.

46. For the precise ways that these categories fail to capture complex historical realities, see Lowe 2012.
References


Lowe: States of “State Buddhism”


